Considering the widespread adoption of smartphones in mobile communications and the well-established resource sharing use in the networking community, we present a novel mechanism to achieve anonymity in the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM). We propose a Voice over Internet Protocol infrastructure using the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) where a smartphone registers on a SIP registrar and can start GSM conversation through another smartphone acting as a GSM gateway, by using a SIP intermediate without an extra cost. The testbed that we developed for empirical evaluation revealed no significant quality of service degradation.
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Resource sharing in community networks is a wellestablished concept since the dawn of the Internet. This has recently evolved through peer to peer networking, to grid computing, and finally to cloud computing services, as the benefits of the collective paradigm are nondisputable.
In the meantime, the wide adoption and commercial success of mobile networks because of the advances of wireless communications has resulted to smartphone being the most preferred device for communicating through a variety of platforms including email, social networking, and messaging.
Calls in the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) are very well regulated. Users are bound to a mobile number according to a regulatory framework, and carriers are obliged to keep logs of their telephony con- versations for a period of up to 2 years (Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC). Carriers offer location-based services because they are able to know and track the phone's location. The GSM encryption A5/1 algorithm is suffering from a number of vulnerabilities, and some carriers have even preinstalled rootkits (Carrier IQ [1] ) on the smartphones for debugging purposes as they claim. However, the lack of privacy is profound as the parties that offer the infrastructure, software, and operating system are sharing information regarding the user's location, preferences, and behavior.
In this paper, we argue that certain privacy goals could be achieved by the active participation and collaboration of a community of users. We focus on the Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and mobile communications and present a proof of concept for performing telephone calls on a mobile network with caller anonymity. The motivation behind the proposed framework is based on the problem of providing caller anonymity where a caller's GSM provider may be malicious and all other participants and nodes of the infrastructure are honest but curious.
There is a number of examples where such a service would be really useful. Totalitarian regimes and countries with limited civilian rights and such environments call for privacy enhancing technologies, Tor being one of the most popular. Government members or big firm executives are often victims of mobile phone eavesdropping. Soldiers out of approach could form an ad hoc wireless network, and one of them acting as the registrar can help others to communicate through a voice network.
In addition to privacy, a new value-added service is created as the participants may also enjoy financial gain because of the (mobile phone) flat rate contract sharing of the particular advantages.
It should be noted that in the context of this paper, caller anonymity relates to the caller ID and the call metadata; the underlying audio stream will be susceptible to passive eavesdropping by the callee's provider. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the related work on which our proposed scheme draws upon. In Section 3, we present the proposed scheme, and in Section 4, we report on some preliminary findings after applying parts of the scheme on our testbed. Section 5 presents the conclusions.
RELATED WORK
In our proposed scheme, we make use of the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) as the underlaying protocol for the VoIP infrastructure. Requirements and specifications for offering caller anonymity over SIP are defined in RFC3323 [2] for three use cases relating to withholding the identity from the intermediary parties, the final destination(s), or both.
Furthermore, RFC3325 describes private extensions to the SIP, which enable a network of trusted SIP servers to assert the identity of authenticated users, and the application of existing privacy mechanisms to the identity problem. This is achieved by inserting a new header in SIP protocol named P-Preferred-Identity [3] . However as RFC states, the use of these extensions is only applicable inside an administrative domain with previously agreedupon policies for generation, transport, and usage of such information, which is not our case.
In [4] , a finer granularity to the anonymity specifications in a SIP context by distinguishing the communicating intermediaries on the caller or callee providers was added. In our proposed solution, there is a need to further elaborate on this definition as the underlying communication environment involves two types of infrastructures (namely the VoIP and the GSM environment). The principle behind our proposed scheme is similar to that of crowds [5] . However, the main difference is that in crowds, anonymity is achieved by routing communication randomly within a group of similar users, whereas in our proposition, we do not allow direct communication between users, and traffic is routed through special SIP protocol capable entities.
https://www.torproject.org/.
Quality of service (QoS) is a critical factor that needs to be considered when designing and deploying any kind of telephony communication. A prevalent QoS feature for telephone communications is the delay [6] , both while establishing a session and, most importantly, during the actual session for the voice stream. Other constraints include the guaranteed ordered arrival of the messages and the unambiguity of the service agreements. These parameters affect significantly the choice of the appropriate privacy enhancing technology. In [4] , the authors present the main categories of privacy enhancing technologies and conclude that a large number of technologies cannot be integrated with a VoIP solution like SIP because of their negative impact on the QoS attributes. For instance, Onion Routing [7] and Mixes [8] exhibit high call delays, whereas Hordes [9] , DC-Nets, and pMixes [10] may be more suitable, but the latter has scalability issues as the underlying computational cost is in O(n 2 ). In addition, many technologies were not designed or implemented with a view to be applied in VoIP communications (Onion Routing, for example), and as such, they do not inherently support User Datagram Protocol (UDP) that makes them suitable only for the call initiation phases. Authors in [11] have proposed the PrivaSIP1 and PrivaSIP2 protocols that are used to hide the caller and callee IDs from intermediate untrusted SIP proxies. They assume that both caller's and callee's SIP registrars have RSA capabilities. They use the public key of the SIP registrar in order to encrypt partial information in the "from" and the "to" SIP headers, respectively. In [12] , the authors have extended their work to use Advanced Encryption Standard and elliptic curves. In case of the Advanced Encryption Standard algorithm, the key is derived from the user's credentials. Our approach has the same result in the untrusted network, and it consumes less computational power as we replace every header with the "anonymous" keyword except from the "to" header that carries the destination GSM phone number. However, authentication between the SIP user agent and the SIP registrar is considered to lie within a trusted environment. Finally, authors in [13] adopted the privacy enhancement framework, called Mist, in a SIP environment achieving in simulation low latency responses from their peers, but the implementation is tested only under special and limited conditions, such as within a 30-s duration call window. In addition, there is limited literature with respect to the quality of the audio in the Real-time Transport Protocol stream.
Although users are familiar with the idea of sharing their computer resources, this is not the case when it comes to sharing their smartphones. As new applications are developed, phone sharing is expected to be a common issue in the near future. An example of such application is xycall that provides new means to optimize communication in a peer-group and subsequently lower telephone bill in the process.
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THE PROPOSED SCHEME
The main idea behind the proposed scheme rests on the assumption that a participant (or smartphone owner) is voluntarily willing to offer his or her equipment for other users to make calls. This setting leads to two advantages. First, the carrier would not be able to establish the identity of the real caller. Second, there could be no charge at all if the offering person has a flat rate contract with the carrier. Clearly, the success of the proposed scheme relies on ease of use, reliability, and level of participation in accordance to Metcalfe's law [14] .
The requirements and issues for a practical solution are summarized with the following questions:
1. How can one discover users willing to offer their phones as SIP-GSM relays? 2. How can one discover the call destinations every user can offer, that is, with which providers do they have an flat rate contract? knows Alice but is not aware that she is making a phone call to a GSM phone. We also assume that honest-but-curious users will not collaborate/share information. Every green cell indicates that in our solution, the corresponding data item (row) is visible to the respective entity (column). The privacy requirements in cells indicate that the corresponding data item should (P3,P4) or not (P1,P2) be visible to the respective entity.
A novel mechanism for anonymizing GSM calls I. Psaroudakis, V. Katos and P. S. Efraimidis 3. How are the participating users protected by other malicious participants? In a resource sharing setting, there may be a number of attacks aiming to exploit an honest user contract.
How do I communicate with them?
Throughout the scheme, the following roles and entities are identified:
Caller: this role refers to the main beneficiary of the infrastructure, which is the user that wishes to make a call to a user (callee) with a selective preservation of her anonymity. Alice will be caller in our examples. Callee: the user that accepts a call. Bob will have this role.
SIP-to-GSM gateway:
The user that acts as a VoIP to GSM gateway and shares his or her GSM service for a certain call session instance. In our scheme, Carol will have this role. SIP registrar: the registrars maintain the user SIP accounts and act as back-to-back user agents [15] . We assume the trusted entities registrar A (for Alice) and registrar C (for Carol). SIP intermediate: act as intermediaries on the communication path providing call routing. We assume a single SIP intermediate entity in one of the scenarios. GSM carrier: This role offers the GSM mobile phone service. We assume the entities GSM carriers A, C, and B, for Alice, Carol, and Bob, respectively. GSM carrier A is assumed to be malicious, and all other entities are assumed to be honest but curious.
Definition 1. Honest-but-curious (HBC):
An HBC (adversary) [16] [17] or the more detailed treatment in [18] .
The anonymous communication scenario
Alice wants to communicate with Bob using her smartphone whilst maintaining her anonymity from her carrier that is GSM carrier A, Bob's carrier that is GSM Carrier B, and Carol's carrier that is GSM carrier C. More importantly, the GSM carrier of Alice should not learn anything about this phone call.
Alice knows that a community of VoIP and GSM users is willing to help by sharing their phone and credits from 
. S. Efraimidis
A novel mechanism for anonymizing GSM calls their contracts. The easiest way is to communicate with some appropriate member (Carol) of the community by using the Internet infrastructure. Carol's device must be able to communicate with Alice using the Internet through her Wireless Internet (Wi-Fi) or High Speed Packet Access connection and at the same time to call Bob using the GSM connection; that is, Carol has to act as a bridge between these two connections ( Figure 1 ).
This particular operation fulfilled by Carol (i.e., her smartphone) is a so-called SIP-to-GSM gateway operation, and it is the core function for the service. The operation has to take place without any actions taken from Carol apart from her declaration of consent to lend her resources. This suggests a user registration phase that is outlined later in this section.
We must note that when Alice is accessing the network by a High Speed Packet Access connection, an encrypted tunnel must be used. This is necessary to avoid a side channel attack by Alice's carrier.
We define the following privacy requirements:
P1 Caller anonymity in the GSM network. Alice's identity should be hidden from GSM carriers A, B, and C.
P2 Mutual anonymity between the caller and the gateway. Alice should not know that her call is routed through Carol and vice versa.
P3 SIP-to-GSM gateway privacy. The gateway's personal information, including its contracts and capabilities A novel mechanism for anonymizing GSM calls I. Psaroudakis, V. Katos and P. S. Efraimidis should only be available to SIP registrar C and GSM carrier C. P4 SIP registrar privacy. There should be no leakage of the information maintained by the SIP registrars A and C.
The main entities, the important information items, and the scope of each item, that is, which entities have access to each item, are shown in Figure 2 . Although in principle the caller's anonymity in the GSM environment can be trivially offered because of the apparent "incompatibility" of the two networks, the caller's identity could be discovered from the actual voice stream that Bob's and Alice's GSM carriers B and C have access to. In general terms, this is considered as a probabilistic side channel, because the probability of identifying the caller from the available audio data is not necessarily equal to one. Because audio data under current regulations are not stored by carriers, the disclosure of Alice identity has to take place only during active calls.
The call metadata stored in the carriers' logfiles will not contribute to any evidence revealing Alice's identity. Furthermore, mutual anonymity is also required between the caller and the gateway. Anonymity of the caller is required because in the opposite case, if Carol (the gateway) is malicious or a passive eavesdropper or (even worse) belongs to the GSM carrier, then she will have access to both the caller and the callee information. Therefore, P1 depends on P2.
P3 is probably the most important requirement. All information provided by the gateway needs to be protected as in the opposite case, a curious participant (e.g., another SIP registrar) may collect valuable data and generate statistics over the users and their contracts, which then can be used for personal gain. P3 also depends upon P4. Because the SIP registrar maintains user information, if P4 is not offered, a curious participant may query a particular registrar and construct aggregate and statistical information about the users hosted by that registrar.
User registration
Each end user of the service will have two distinct roles, namely the caller (which will be using the SIP functionality) or the SIP2GSM gateway mentioned earlier. We will refer to them as endpoint users of the SIP infrastructure.
Assume a working system that users want to get access to its services. Endpoint users must first obtain an account from a trusted SIP registrar. A typical registration process may involve visiting a website run by the SIP registrar and filling in an online application form with the necessary information for the service to operate successfully. This application should consist of the following five sections:
User Registration Application Form Section A1: "Personal Data" -Username (e.g., email address) and a password for accessing their account when they sign on and for updating their profile data. -A valid email address to send a verification email in order to enable the service. -Credentials for the SIP network. The username and password created here will be used when endpoint users set up their smartphone sip2gsm application along with the SIP client program in order to be authenticated by the SIP registrar. Section A2: "Network/Sharing Resources" -GSM carrier contract to share. -UDP port to use for sip2gsm application.
Section A3: "Policy Data" -Whitelist/blacklist for subscribers that endpoint users wish to or do not allow to be called from their device. Section A5: "License Agreement" -In this section, the endpoint user is informed about the service levels and that the application is offered as a public service.
Following the endpoint user registration, the data provided will allow the SIP registrar to create as follows:
1. A SIP account for the SIP client application. 2. A SIP account for the sip2gsm operation. 3. The outgoing trunk for the specific carrier that is shared.
It is worth noting here the importance of the Section A2 parameters that the user is declaring because on these values relies on the whole operation. Each smartphone establishes two concurrent Internet Protocol connections with the trusted SIP registrar. The first connection is used by the SIP client application so as the smartphone is capable to make a call and the second connection is necessary for the sip2gsm application in order to forward the call to the GSM network (Figure 3) .
In addition, the SIP registrar will update the outbound route for the specific carrier with the new trunk member when the endpoint user is in service. This operation will be continuously updated as endpoint users are expected to continuously enter and leave the network.
Session Initiation Protocol registrars are assumed to be trusted and to act as agents on behalf of the users. As back-to-back user agents, the registrars operate between the end points of the voice session during the phone calls. The general privacy assumption here is that the user may trust its registrar but should not be obliged to trust other registrars or SIP intermediates. It is the user's registrar's responsibility to protect the user's personal data including his or her capabilities from curious or even malicious participants who could try to collect statistics on user carrier contract data.
Trusted SIP registrar and SIP intermediates
As noted earlier, a user trusts a SIP registrar for providing their data and obtaining an account. Every SIP registrar in turn needs to be affiliated with at least one SIP intermediate server. The process is described in the succeeding text.
The affiliation is initiated with the SIP registrar administrator who will provide the following data to the SIP intermediate server during the application process: SIP Registrar Application Form Section R1: "Personal Data" -Username (the email address of the administrator) and a password for accessing their account when they sign on to update their profile data. -A valid email address where verification email will be send in order to enable the service. -Credentials for the SIP network. The username and password created here will be used when administrators build their trunks to the SIP intermediate server in order to be authenticated by the SIP service. Section R2: "Network/Sharing Resources" -GSM carriers that trusted SIP registrars can route calls to.
-UDP port to use for sip2sip peering.
-Landline numbers that trusted SIP registrars can route calls to. Lastly, the SIP intermediate server will update the outbound route directory for the specific carriers that the new trunk member can serve. This update operation will be regularly performed as trunks are expected to continuously enter and leave the network. The operation of the outbound route directory of the SIP intermediate server is similar to the routing table of a router.
Baseline case: mutually trusted registrars
We initially setup a testbed consisting of two registrars. In the baseline scenario, we assumed that the registrars are mutually trusted in the sense that the gateway's registrar will have knowledge of the caller's registrar (but not the caller's ID as there is no reason to disclose this piece of information). This setting is presented in Figure 4 , whereas the corresponding communication messages and sequence are presented in the diagram in Figure 5 .
The 401 Unauthorized message is noteworthy; this is triggered because the first SIP INVITE is unauthenticated and is part of the connection process flow. The sequence of two SIP INVITE messages can be utilized for intrusion detection purposes, as this pattern describes a legitimate request.
In terms of the stated privacy requirements, the aforementioned setting can partially meet P1 through P3. This can be achieved if the capabilities discovery process is executed between the registrars and without disclosing the caller's and gateway's identities. For example, Alice, maintaining a contract with carrier A, wishes to call a user who is with carrier B. Alice's registrar will issue a request "Who has flat rates with carrier B?" and will receive an answer from Carol's registrar of a type "I have a user(s) with a contract with B". Carol's registrar could also create a temporary pseudonym of Carol to assist future identification of the resource and speed up the subsequent process steps. Because of the presence of direct communication between registrars, requirement P4 cannot be met unless some sophisticated cryptographic protocol is used. What follows in the next section is a proposal for achieving registrar privacy and further strengthening P3.
Private Voice over Internet Protocol to Global System for Mobile Communications gateway discovery
A fully developed version of our system will have to address additional privacy issues that arise in auxiliary functions of the system. An example is the gateway discovery procedure discussed earlier. If the SIP registrar A is trusted (as we assumed earlier), then the privacy of Alice is preserved while requesting to use the platform for a call to Bob. Similarly, if the registrar C of Carol is trusted, then Carol can safely advertise her readiness to act as SIP-to-GSM gateway for specific GSM carriers. The aforementioned scheme can be further improved by adding a SIP intermediate server to it. However, in all these cases, privacy relies on assumptions about the participating entities and/or the introduction of a SIP intermediate. A challenging requirement would be to solve the same problem for HBC or even malicious entities, by applying advanced cryptographic techniques. For example, in [19] , the authors presented a cryptographic protocol for privacy-preserving service discovery in ubiquitous computing environments. We are currently examining a similar service for the needs of our application.
Testbed develpment
We implemented the proposed framework and conducted a series of experiments. We used two CentOS servers with Asterisk software as SIP registrar entities, a third Asterisk server as the SIP intermediate server, and a VoIP Analog Telephony Adaptor (Linksys SPA3000) with Fixed Cellural Terminal from Ericsson as VoIP-to-GSM gateway ( Figure 6 ) simulating the application to be developed for smartphones. The initial caller (Alice) was an Android smartphone running the CSipSimple SIP application.
The main difference between the new framework and the one we presented in our earlier work [20] is the replacement of the TekSIP proxy server with another Asterisk server as SIP intermediate. This choice gives us the ability to manipulate SIP headers in order to eliminate information leakage regarding identity and to significantly improve performance.
The RFC3323 [2] states that SIP entities (intermediates or proxies) add headers on their own that they could reveal information about the originator of a message; for example, a Via ' header might reveal the service provider through whom the user sends requests, which might in turn strongly hint at the user's identity to some recipients. RFC Asterisk is a popular software implementation of a telephone private branch exchange (PBX). ' The Via header is used to record the SIP route taken by a request and is used to route a response back to the originator. states also that the following SIP headers, when generated by a user agent, can directly or indirectly reveal identity information about the originator of a message: from, contact, reply-to, via, call-info, user-agent, organization, server, subject, call-ID, in-reply-to, and warning. The same may occur during the authentication procedure.
Because we use trusted SIP registrars that act as back to back user agents, it is safer to strip off this kind of information before forwarding the message to SIP intermadiate server than expecting from each user agent not to reveal such information. In particular, special modifications were taken into the SIP registrars and the SIP intermediate server's configuration's files to accomplish that.
For the data collection, we used a 2960G-Gigabit (Cisco, San-Francisco, California, USA) switch with port monitoring enabled. For analyzing the SIP negotiation (Figure 7) Authorization: Digest user name="604", realm="Asterisk", nonce="1be6b04e", uri="SIP:6977xx xxxx@xxx.xxx.duth.gr", response="cbb7187f375ee94ec625cae 946c4be41", algorithm=MD5 Authentication Scheme: Digest username="604" realm="Asterisk" nonce="1be6b04e" uri="SIP:6977xxxxxx@xxx.xxx. duth.gr" response="cbb7187f375ee94ec625c ae946c4be41" algorithm=MD5 Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 367 It is worth mentioning that we have three major disclosures regarding Alice. We can learn the username and the user ID that she uses when registering to registrar A, which is "604". Both data items are reported in several fields in many SIP headers but especially in Authorization: Digest username="604". We can also learn the application she is using to make phone calls. This information is in header User-Agent: CSipSimple r1108 / E10i-7. The name of the application is CSipSimple with revision r1108. Even more interesting is the fact that we can learn the make and model number of smartphone E10i-7 that Alice is using. That model number leads us to the commercial name "Sony Ericsson Xperia X10 mini". From Session Description Protocol and Session Name header, we can learn that the application is using the "pjmedia" ** media stack for the audio stream. Finally, from the Authorization header and the realm value, we can learn that Alice's registrar is based on Asterisk PBX software.
We proceeded to the appropriate modifications in registrar's A configuration so as to block any information leakage regarding Alice and the server itself. All packets that are sent from registrar A to the SIP intermediate are sanitized of sensitive information. Even better all possible values that can reveal identity information have been removed or replaced with "anonymous" keyword or "anonymous.invalid" domain as RFC 3323 suggests. This can be seen in detail in the following listing that refers to the SIP INVITE method from registrar A to SIP intermediate.
